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Abstract
Fiscal and financial management in South Asian cities typically face constraints in capacity
and utilization of resources. This paper attempts a systematic analysis of three corporations
in the region: the Indian city of Kolkata (Kolkata Municipal Corporation, KMC) and the
city corporations in Bangladesh’s capital city, Dhaka (Dhaka North City Corporation,
DNCC, and Dhaka South City Corporation, DSCC). Based on the incomes and
expenditures of these corporations, this paper attempts for the first time a comparison in
the status of finances and service delivery in cities of two South Asian Countries. The main
findings suggest that the revenue receipts of KMC is significantly higher than that of either
DNCC or DSCC or even both the bodies combined. This is true for own revenue as well
as for grants from the upper tiers. Both DNCC and DSCC have expenses, which are way
below the low level of existing earnings. These expenses are less when compared with
international expenditure norms also. For KMC the revenue is not sufficient to cover the
expenditures. For DNCC and DSCC, levels of expenditures on provision of urban services
are abysmally low, which is also reflected in the status of service delivery in these cities.
Property tax accounts for the lion’s share of the tax revenue in both Kolkata and Dhaka.
For Dhaka, non-tax revenues obtained from fees, fines, rates, etc. have a higher share in
own revenue, while Kolkata has higher shares of taxes. Interestingly, despite the low
revenue generation capacity of the DNCC and DSCC, this is what comprises the bulk of
total revenue. Grants received from the upper tiers are very low in DNCC and DSCC
compared to the fact that close to half of KMC’s total revenue comes from grants. We also
estimated the GCP for Dhaka and Kolkata and did some simulation exercises for estimating
the revenue capacities. Based on these exercises, we suggest that KMC should generate up
to 4 percent of their GCP as revenues for the corporation. For Dhaka, 1 percent of GCP as
revenues in both DNCC and DSCC are estimated as their potentials.
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1. Introduction
With a growing rate of population, migration and the burgeoning demand for industrialization,
there has been a great pressure on urban infrastructure in the cities of South Asia. India and
Bangladesh are no exceptions. The process of decentralization took a strong hold in India during
the 74th Amendment Act in 1992, which devolved certain functions and finances to the urban
local governments. 1 With a federal system of government, India has fairly independent states
which exert substantial control over the local rural and urban bodies, although the devolution
varies across the states. Bangladesh, on the other hand, has a unitary democratic form of
government with largely deconcentrated rather than devolved local bodies. Since the 1972
constitutional provision of elected local government (Articles 59 and 60) which requires the
parliament to determine specific responsibilities for the local bodies, local government has had a
checkered history in Bangladesh. Despite the efforts towards decentralization in both Dhaka and
Kolkata, the status of basic services like roads, sewerage, sanitation and street lighting continues
to remain inadequate.
In this paper, we analyze the performance of the two urban local bodies (ULB) in Dhaka- Dhaka
North City Corporation (DNCC) and Dhaka South City Corporation (DSCC) and one urban local
body in India- Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC). The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 sets the context by discussing some socio-economic indicators in all the three
corporations. Section 3 gives a broad idea about the finances in the three ULBs. An assessment
of fiscal health of each city corporation is attempted in Section 4. Section 5 suggests some
simple simulations to assess the maximum revenue potentials of the city governments. A

A list of functions and finances undertaken by Indian urban local government is given in Box A1 and Box A2,
Appendix.
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comparative analysis of the status of service delivery is offered in section 6. Section 7 concludes
the discussions.
2. Socio-Economic Indicators
Population dynamics in Bangladesh is now primarily an urban phenomenon. Approximately 37
percent of the country’s 161.8 million people live in the urban areas. The urbanization has been
such that Dhaka, the capital city, has also emerged as the primate city. It houses an estimated
11.1 million people making it home to more than 35 percent of the urban population and more
than 10 percent of the total population of Bangladesh. The population density in the city exceeds
35,000 people per square kilometer. We collected information on the population figures for the
two city corporation areas for 2017-18, which is shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Demographics in DNCC and DSCC and KMC*

ULB
Population
Area (square km)
Population Density (persons/km2)
DNCC
4,832,346
197
24,530
DSCC
3,883,423
109.3
35,546
KMC
4,496,694
207
21,739
Source: Authors’ computation based on data collected from DNCC and DSCC; Census of India (2011)
Note: Data for DNCC and DSCC pertain to 2017-18, while for KMC data is for 2011.

A look at few of the other socio-economic characteristics of Dhaka city reveal a literacy rate of
74.6 percent in 2011 (Table 2). When we consider the urban parts of Dhaka Division and overall
Dhaka district (Dhaka zila) the figures are lower. 2 Literacy rate is an indicator of the extent of
awareness and the demands that people place on service delivery. Literacy rate can also throw
light on the level of development and hence the revenue raising capacity of the city. Participation
of people in economic activities is an important indicator that can inform about the vibrancy of
the city, the demand for service delivery and the quantum of revenue that can be generated from

2

The administrative set-up in Bangladesh is given in the Appendix.
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the incomes of the people in the city. We find that the crude activity rate 3 in Dhaka district is
only 44.34 percent. With more than half the population outside the sphere of economic activity
and yet demanding the services in the area, there exists a tremendous pressure on the city
corporations for providing the services to this proportion of the population vis-à-vis revenue
generated from the usage of those services by this proportion of population. The population
density figures that we have already observed lend further credence to the pressure that is put on
the service delivery in both DNCC and DSCC. It may be noted that although the DNCC has
approximately one million people more than the DSCC, the pressure on services is higher in the
latter, because the population density in DNCC is lower by almost 11,000 people per square
kilometer compared to DSCC. Although figures on housing characteristics are not available
separately for the city corporation areas, the number of people residing in pucca houses for
Dhaka district (urban) is approximately 54 percent.
Table 2. Socio-Economic Indicators in Dhaka
Indicators
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka division)
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka district)
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka City Corporation)
Crude Activity Rate (Dhaka district)
Source: BBS (2012, 2014a, 2014b)

Percentage
64.3
71.1
74.6
44.34

The KMC is one of the largest ULBs in India, which has a high population density of 21,739 per
square km (Table 1). It is spread over an area of 207 square km as per the Census of India, 2011,
which has increased from 186 square km in 2001. There has been a fall in the population from
4,580,546 in 2001 to 4,496,694 in 2011. However, despite the fall, the population density in
KMC is as high as 21,739 persons per square kilometer (Census of India, 2011). The literacy rate

The crude activity rate is defined as the ratio of economically active population in the age group 10 years and over
to the total population expressed in percentage.
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stands at 80 percent. Another indicator of development is given by the percentage of people
living in the permanent houses, 4 which stands at 93 percent.
A preliminary comparison of the two cities reveal that the KMC has a lower population density
and a higher literacy rate than the Dhaka city corporations. Unfortunately, other indicators
available cannot be directly compared. However, it can be deduced that KMC would have a
lesser burden on existing level of services compared to DNCC and DSCC. That the demand and
revenue generation might not be enough in Dhaka cities can also be concluded by the fact that
only approximately 44 percent of their population are economically active. Within Dhaka, we
see that DNCC is better placed than DSCC due to lesser population density and hence lower
pressure on the existing services. The effect of these on service delivery is seen later in the paper.
3. Finances of the Corporations: Revenues and Expenditures
We took the revenue receipts and revenue expenditure data for all the cities in 2011-12 prices
and converted the currencies of each country into US dollars to make the comparison easier
between KMC and the two Dhaka city corporations by multiplying the values for each year by
the respective exchange rate for each country. 5
When we compare the finances of DNCC and DSCC with KMC, we find a stark difference.
(Table 3). Property tax, 6 which is the more important source of revenue for any local body, is
higher in KMC by over 450 percent as compared to DNCC as well as DSCC. In absolute terms,
the per capita property tax is higher in KMC by US$ 17.6 for DNCC and US$ 17.8 in DSCC.

Permanent houses refer to those houses whose walls & roofs are made of pucca materials, i.e., where burnt bricks,
G.I. sheets or other metal sheets, stone, cement, concrete is used for wall and tiles, slate, shingle, corrugated iron,
zinc or other metal sheets, asbestos sheets, bricks, lime and stone and RBC/RCC are used for roof.
5
Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/INR-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2020.html
6
Valuation method of property tax in KMC is provided in Box A3, Appendix.
4

4

The predominance of property in total tax revenue yields the same pattern gets in tax revenue as
well. The non-tax revenue is also higher in KMC compared to both DNCC and DSCC by a
margin of over 200 percent. Per capita grants are in KMC amount to US$75.5 while the
corresponding figures for DNCC and DSCC are a paltry US$0.6 and US$ 1.5 respectively. It
appears that the both DNCC and DSCC do not get enough support from the upper tiers of the
government (See Table A1, Appendix for year wise data on finances in DNCC, DSCC and
KMC). It is in the fitness of things to mention here that we have not considered receipts from
project funds in case of DNCC and DSCC. 7 This is because projects have separate time-bound
expenditure requirement that would give us a misleading picture of city corporation finances, if
included with the rest of the income sources. However, from the budget documents, we
calculated the grants from the upper tiers of the government because of projects and these varied
from less than 15 percent of the total income exclusive of project funds to more than 90 percent
of the same.
In terms of per capita revenue expenditure, we see a similar pattern; the gap between KMC and
DNCC stands at US$71.9 and between KMC and DSCC stands at US$69.8. Between 2012-13
and 2018-19, the per capita revenue expenditure in both the city corporations in Dhaka did not
go beyond a high of US$ 6.5, while for KMC it had reached US$ 112. With a substantially lower
level of expenditure by both DNCC and DSCC, we can expect their service delivery to be falling
behind KMC. This will be elaborated in a later section.

7

KMC did not receive any head called ‘project fund’ under its revenue receipts.
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Table 3. Summary statistics of per capita revenue and expenditure (in US dollars)

Local body
KMC
DNCC
DSCC
Finances
Geometric Mean
Geometric Mean
Geometric Mean
(in US $)
(Max, Min)
(Max, Min)
(Max, Min)
Property Tax
21.5 (31.8, 14.5)
3.9 (4.5, 2.9)
3.7 (4.9, 2.5)
Tax Revenue
22.3 (32.5, 15.3)
4 (4.7, 3)
3.8 (5, 2.6)
Non Tax Revenue
14.2 (20.5, 1)
4.3 (4.9, 3.4)
4.7 (5.7, 3.9)
Own Revenue
36.6 (49.8, 23.5)
8.3 (9.4, 6.4)
8.5 (9.8, 6.8)
Grants
34.2 (40.3, 28.2)
0.6 (2.2, 0.3)
1.5 (5.9, 0.7)
Total Revenue Receipts
72.1 (90.4, 51.7)
9.5 (11.4, 7.1)
10.8 (14.6, 7.6)
Total Revenue Expenditure
75.5 (112, 64)
3.6 (4.1, 2.8)
5.7 (6.5, 5)
Source: Authors’ computation
Note: The average value is taken over the year 2010-11 to 2017-18 for KMC (due to availability of average yearly
exchange rate from the year 2010 onwards). The period under consideration for both DNCC and DSCC is 2012-13
to 2018-19.

Let us look in more detail at the different components of revenue receipts in all the three ULBs.
Table 4 gives us the shares of different components of revenue in own revenue and/or in total
revenue receipts. Property tax comprises 97 percent of the tax revenue in all the three ULBs.
However, its share is higher in the own revenue in KMC (57 percent) as compared to DNCC
(46.8 percent) and DSCC (43 percent). Property tax also forms a lower share of total revenue
receipts in KMC as compared to both DNCC and DSCC. We see that KMC draws most of its
own revenues through tax income (61 percent) while for DNCC and DSCC this share is less than
50 percent. For the latter, the non-tax revenue forms a greater proportion in their own revenues.
With property tax rates remaining stagnant since the late 1980s in the face of failed attempts to
revise the rates, this has been an under-explored option for the Dhaka city corporations. Grants
as a proportion of total revenue can give us some idea about the extent of decentralization and
self-reliance. In KMC, 44 percent of the total revenue is obtained from grants. The
corresponding share is much lower for DNCC at 7.5 percent and for DSCC at 13.8 percent. We
cannot really tout this as a self-reliance of Dhaka cities rather it is a reflection of poor
decentralization of finances from the upper tiers of government. The next section brings revenue
receipts and revenue expenditures together to analyze the fiscal health of the ULBs.
6

Table 4. Share of Different Revenue Components in Own Revenue and Total Revenue (%)
(average over years)
Local body

Share (%)
Property Tax to Tax
Revenue
Property Tax to Own
Revenue
Property Tax to Total
Revenue Receipts
Tax Revenue to Own
Revenue
Non Tax Revenue to Own
Revenue
Own Revenue to Total
Revenue
Tax Revenue to Total
Revenue
Non Tax Revenue to
Total Revenue
Grants to Total Revenue
Other Income to Total
Revenue
Source: Authors’ computation

KMC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)

DNCC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)

DSCC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)

96.4
(95, 98)
59%
(52, 64)
30
(27, 35)
61
(54, 65)
39
(35, 46)
51
(45, 56)
31
(28, 36)
20
(16, 26)
47
(38, 55)
0.27
(0.07, 7)

96.7
(98, 95)
46.8
(46, 49)
40.6
(36, 44.5)
48.4
(47, 51)
51.6
(49, 54)
86.8
(79, 92)
42
(37, 46)
44.7
(42, 47)
7.5
(3, 19)
2.7
(0.9, 2.7)

96.9
(96.3, 98)
43
(35, 50)
34.2
(27, 41)
44.4
(36, 51)
55
(49, 64)
79
(58, 93)
35.2
(36, 51)
43.7
(30.4, 57)
13.8
(5.6, 40)
0.6
(0, 11.7)

4. An Assessment of Fiscal Health
We consider three important determinants of fiscal health, viz. revenue-expenditure gap, own
revenue to GCP ratio and revenue capacity. A comparison of the revenue and expenditure gap
across the cities reveal that the per capita revenue expenditure exceeds per capita own revenue
receipts by US$ 43.4 on an average in KMC, whereas the own revenues are sufficient enough to
cover revenue expenditure in both DNCC and DSCC (Table 5). When we compare the revenue
expenditure per capita to the total revenue receipts per capita, we see that again the total
revenues fall short of the revenue expenditure by US$ 7.8 in KMC. But in DNCC and DSCC the
per capita revenue receipts exceed the per capita total revenue expenditure. One might call it a
better scenario in DNCC and DSCC as compared to KMC, but we need to note the level of

7

services provided by the city corporations to comment further on it (It could be because the
ULBs are incurring insufficient expenditure on the services)
The own revenue to GCP ratio tells us about the share of the city product generated as own
revenue by the cities. Since we do not have data on GCP for each city/corporation, we estimate
the GCP by using the Gross District Domestic Product for KMC and the data available for the
Dhaka Urban Cluster for DNCC and DSCC. The methodologies differ slightly between India and
Bangladesh due to availability of data at different dis-aggregation levels.
Table 5. Financial Indicators (per capita, USD)

Own Revenue
Revenue Expenditure
Own Revenue and Revenue Expenditure gap
Total Revenue receipts
Revenue Expenditure
Total Revenue and Revenue Expenditure gap
Source: Authors’ computations

KMC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)
36.6
(24, 50)
75.5
(64, 112)
-43.4
(-70, -34)
72.1
(52, 90)
75.5
(64, 112)
-7.8
(-30, 1.6)

DNCC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)
8.3
(6.4, 9.4)
3.6
(2.8, 4.1)
4.8
(3.5, 6)
9.5
(7.1, 11.4)
3.6
(2.8, 4.1)
6.1
(4.3, 7.7)

DSCC
Geometric Mean
(Min, Max)
8.5
(6.8, 9.8)
5.7 (
5, 6.5)
2.8
(1, 4)
10.8
(7.6, 14.6)
5.7
(5, 6.5)
5.1
(1.9, 8.1)

Method of Estimation of Gross City Product for KMC:
For KMC, we took the non-agricultural component of Gross District Domestic Product (GDDP)
as a proxy for GCP. We estimate the non-agricultural component of the GDDP by multiplying
the share of urban population by the GDDP for each year. We estimate the own revenue to GCP
ratio for the period 2007-08 through 2012-13. 8 The geometric mean for 2007-08 to 2012-13 was
1.6 percent.

8

We had the latest data available for GDDP until only the year 2012-13.
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Method of Estimation of Gross City Product for Dhaka
In the absence of any estimate of GCP in Dhaka, we used the contribution done by the Dhaka
Urban Cluster in the GDP to estimate the GCP of Dhaka. The contribution of Dhaka Urban
Cluster in the national GDP is 36 percent (Jha, Raghuram and Awasthi, 2019). With GDP of
Bangladesh in current prices for 2017-18 standing at BDT 22,38,498 crores, the contribution of
Dhaka Urban Cluster works out to be BDT 8,05,859 crores. The population for Dhaka Urban
Cluster 9 is 18.9 million (Jha, Raghuram and Awasthi, 2019). Thus the per capita income in the
Dhaka Urban Cluster is BDT 4,26,381. Taking this as a benchmark, we construct a scenario,
where we estimate GCP for both the corporations. We then do a simulation for estimating the
revenue capacity.
We assume that the per capita income for Dhaka Urban Cluster is the same in both the city
corporations. Thus, we take per capita GCP to be BDT 4,26,381 in DNCC as well as in DSCC.
Multiplying by the respective populations of DNCC and DSCC, we get the total estimated GCP
generated in each city corporation (Table 6). Using the own revenue generated in the year 201718 in DNCC and DSCC at market prices, we find the own revenue to GCP ratio at 0.3 percent in
DNCC and 0.28 percent in DSCC.
For KMC, we took the non-agricultural component of Gross District Domestic Product (GDDP)
as a proxy for GCP. We take the per capita non- agricultural component of GDDP of Kolkata
district, 10 in which KMC is located, as a proxy of per capita GCP in KMC. Multiplying this per
capita income by the population of KMC, we generate the estimate of GCP in KMC. We

9

Map 1 in the Appendix gives an idea about the urban cluster of Dhaka in Bangladesh
Map 2 in the Appendix gives an idea about the location of Kolkata district in the state of West Bengal in India.
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estimate the own revenue to GCP ratio for the period 2007-08 through 2012-13. 11 The geometric
mean was 1.6 percent.
Table 6. Estimates of GCP and own revenue to GCP ratios
Variables

Dhaka

Contribution of Dhaka Urban Cluster in GDP of Bangladesh
GDP of Bangladesh for the year 2017-18 in current prices in BDT
GCP (36% of GDP for 2017-18 in current prices) in BDT
Total Population in Dhaka Urban Cluster
Per Capita GCP for Dhaka Urban Cluster
Assumption: Per capita GCP is the same in DNCC and DSCC
Per capita GCP
Population in 2017-18
Estimated Gross City Product in BDT
Own Revenue for the year 2017-18 in current prices
Own Revenue to GCP ratio (%)
Source: Authors’ computation

36%
2238498,00,00,000
805859,28,00,000
1,89,00,000
4,26,381
DNCC

DSCC

4,26,381
48,35,180
2061,62,69,15,157
612,07,36,768
0.30

4,26,381
35,63,376
1519,35,42,31,896
422,99,41,881
0.28

Table 7 gives own revenue to GCP ratio of all the three city corporations. For Dhaka, we take the
most optimistic scenario of 0.30 for DNCC and 0.28 for DSCC and compare this with KMC for
which the actual own revenue to GCP ratio is 1.6 percent. Thus, KMC performs better than the
Dhaka city corporations in this regard as well. In the next section we estimate the revenue
capacity by estimating the maximum own revenue that each city is able to generate.
Table 7. Own revenue to GCP ratio (percent)
Own Revenue-GCP Ratio
Source: Authors’ computation

KMC
1.6

DNCC
0.30

DSCC
0.28

Note: We have taken the geometric mean for KMC (from 2007-08 through 2012-13). For Dhaka cities, the value
pertains to 2017-18, for which it was feasible to estimate GCP and hence the ratio.

11

We had the latest data available for GDDP until 2012-13.
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5. Revenue Capacity Estimations
The most optimistic scenario is estimated for all three corporations. We do some simulations to
see how much can the own revenue be raised in each city. In case of KMC, we find the actual
own revenue to GCP ratio to be 1.6 percent. With this level of own revenue receipts, the KMC
was not able to meet its revenue expenditure. We raise the ratio of own revenue to GCP to 2
percent and estimated the own revenue receipts at this ratio. At this level of own revenue also,
the local body was not able to meet the revenue expenditure. We do a second simulation where
we estimate the own revenue to GCP ratio such that own revenues can cover the revenue
expenditure. We took the average revenue expenditure to GCP ratio of 3.2 percent as the
benchmark. We find that KMC was able to meet its revenue expenditure in only two of the years
under consideration and in the remaining years it could not meet the revenue expenditure with
the estimated own revenue. In the third simulation we raised own revenue to GCP ratio to 4
percent and estimated the own revenue, that is the most optimistic scenario. We find that the
local body was able to meet its revenue expenditures in all the years with this level of own
revenue.
In case of DNCC and DSCC, we followed a different approach. We did not consider revenue
expenditure as one of the variables to suggest the raise required in the own revenue because own
revenue receipts already exceeded the revenue expenditure in both the ULBs. We considered the
lowest own revenue to GCP ratio as found for KMC as a guide to decide the most optimistic
scenario. The lowest own revenue to GCP found in KMC was in the year 2010-11 at 1.3 percent.
We suggest own revenue to GCP to be at least 1 percent in both DNCC and DSCC (which is
lower than the lowest ratio found for KMC). Thus, in order to improve the fiscal performance of
the cities under the study we suggest own revenue to GCP ratio to be 4 percent for KMC, and 1
11

percent for both DNCC and DSCC. We now analyze the status of service delivery in KMC,
DNCC and DSCC.
6. Service Delivery Indicators
For the Dhaka city corporations, we considered the 2011 census data, when the DNCC and
DSCC were unified under the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). Data on service delivery was
collected from the DNCC and DSCC and these are compared it with the physical norms. In the
absence of physical norms for service delivery for Bangladesh, we consider the
recommendations by the High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) (GOI, 2011) as benchmarks.
In terms of having tap as a source of drinking water and electricity as a source of lighting, both
KMC and the Dhaka City Corporation are close to each other (Table 8). Both the cities are
performing well in these two aspects particularly with respect to access to electricity with 96
percent and above households having the facility. DNCC has 100 percent closed sewerage while
for DSCC the share is only 52 percent. In Kolkata city, about 43 percent of the households have
piped sewers. With respect to solid waste management, collection efficiency is much below the
recommended norm. Both DNCC and DSCC are able to collect less than 75 percent of the solid
waste generated in the city. The remaining lies in the open unattended (Ahmed, 2014). Both the
road density as well as area under roads also falls much below the norm. Overall, KMC is doing
better than both DNCC and DSCC and within Dhaka; one can say that the higher expenditure in
the DSCC is not reflected in better service delivery as compared to DNCC. DSCC falls behind
DNCC in both solid waste collection and closed sewerage.

12

Table 8. Service Delivery for KMC, DNCC and DSCC* vis-à-vis Service Delivery Norms
Services
Households
having
electricity as a source of
lighting
Households having tap as a
source of drinking water
Sewerage and Drainage
Solid Waste Generated**
(tons/day)
Solid Waste collection (%)

Kolkata

Dhaka

Norms

96%

98.6%

88%

85.4%

43% households with piped
sewers
81% households having access
to closed drainage
4500 MT/ day

DNCC-100%
closed
sewerage
DSCC-52%
closed
sewerage
4220 (DNCC)
3300 (DSCC)
74% (DNCC) (2018-19)
(household
waste,
partial
construction
waste, street waste and
business waste)
70% (DSCC) (2016)
(domestic waste)
6.9 (DNCC)
9.2 (DSCC)

NA

NA
NA
100%
underground
sewerage

100%
efficiency

collection

Road Density (km per
12.25
square km)
Road (% age of area under
11%
5% (DSCC)
roads)***
Sources: 1) Field Survey for DNCC and DSCC, 2) Census of India, 2011 and Status Report Solid Waste Management
(Feb 2019) for KMC; 3) HPEC (2011); 4) DNCC (2019); 5) Wasim and Nine (2017)
*Data was available for the year 2017-18 (except for road (%age), which was available for the year 2012-13)
** The source for DNCC for solid waste generated and collected was DNCC (2019) and for DSCC was Wasim and
Nine (2017)
***data was not available for DNCC

Comparison of Finances with Benchmarks
After comparing the service delivery, we now compare the expenditure incurred by the ULBs to
the city size-wise financial benchmarks set by the High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC)
(GOI, 2011) for Indian cities. This analysis is done only for KMC, as we could not get the data
on service level expenditure incurred by DNCC and DSCC. We compared the existing per capita
expenditures with the per capita operation and maintenance financial norms given by the High
Powered Expert Committee (GOI, 2011). For all the five basic services together (that is water
supply, sewerage and drainage, streetlights, roads and solid waste management), the average
expenditure incurred by KMC was much below the financial norms prescribed, indicating a lack
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of adequate level of service delivery. In addition, when we look at the trend over time, we see
that the gap between actual revenue expenditure and expenditure norms increases over time.
While the norms remain the same for each year, we can say that there has been a consistent fall
in the revenue expenditure by the KMC over time. Table 9 provides the gap between revenue
expenditure on services and expenditure norms over years
Table 9. Fiscal Health in KMC over Years (per capita US$)
Indicator
2010-11
Gap between revenue
expenditure and
4.1
expenditure norms
Source: Authors’ computation

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

-6

-2.9

-6.2

-3.9

-6.3

-7.2

-8.3

7. Summary of Findings and Implications for Policy
The paper has presented an overview of the finances of the corporation in the Indian city of
Kolkata (KMC) and the city corporations in Bangladesh’s capital city, Dhaka (DNCC and
DSCC). Based on the incomes and expenditures of these three corporations, we delve into the
implications for service delivery in both Kolkata and Dhaka. KMC is about 2/3rd of the size of
DNCC and DSCC combined and has a much lower population density. Data reveals that the
revenue receipts of KMC is significantly higher than that of either DNCC or DSCC or even both
the bodies combined. This is true for own revenue as well as for grants from the upper tiers.
What emerges as a stark difference in our finding is that both DNCC and DSCC have expenses,
which are way below the low level of existing earnings. These expenses are less when compared
with international expenditure norms. Thus, revenues are higher than expenditures in the case of
the city corporations in Dhaka while for the KMC the revenue is not sufficient to cover the
expenditures. It is to be noted that the expenses stated in this analysis do not include capital
expenditures or loan repayments. Even then, positive revenue expenditure gaps for DNCC and
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DSCC would not indicate a ‘surplus’, but abysmally low levels of expenditures on provision of
urban services, which is also reflected in the status of service delivery in these cities.
Property tax accounts for lion’s share of the tax revenue in both Kolkata and Dhaka. Total tax
revenues constitute the greater part of own revenue for KMC while for Dhaka non-tax revenues
obtained from fees, fines, rates, etc. has a higher share in own revenue. Interestingly, despite the
low revenue generation capacity of the DNCC and DSCC, this is what comprises the bulk of
total revenue. Grants received from the upper tiers is very low in DNCC and DSCC compared to
the fact that close to half of KMC’s total revenue comes from grants.
Service delivery is a primary manifestation of the level of expenditure. In both DNCC and
DSCC, the low spending is reflected in the poor delivery of essential services. When compared
with the recommended physical norms, the status quo in Dhaka is much below the norms.
Kolkata also falls short of the norms but the gap between the norms and the status quo is smaller
compared to that of Dhaka.
We juxtaposed the expenditure norms with the actual revenue expenditure in the case of KMC.
This could not be done for Dhaka due to non-availability of service-wise revenue expenditure.
We also estimated the GCP for Dhaka and did some simulation exercises for raising the revenue
capacity. Based on these exercises, we suggest raising the own revenue to GCP ratio in KMC to
4 percent and to at least 1 percent in both DNCC and DSCC.
For KMC, we propose an increase in own revenue by tapping its property tax and non-tax
revenue handles. With respect to the property tax, we need to introduce a GIS mapping of
properties. In case of non-tax revenue, we suggest 1) enhancing the rates/charges of the existing
handles and 2) introducing new handles. For the existing handles are concerned in the non-tax
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component, the services like roads, sewerage and drainage should be improved, which can
further help KMC raise revenues from these handles. KMC has plans to improve the Solid Waste
Management, which can help it raise revenue from this handle by increasing the existing charges.
Another potential handle is car-parking fees. Given the increasing numbers of private cars, KMC
should raise the car parking fees, which is still on hold. The cable operators pay a share of their
fees to Multiple System Operators, as prescribed by TRAI, but it is found unjustified by the
operators. Some portion of this could be diverted to KMC as cable operator charges. The
unrecorded (illegal) installation of mobile towers over building rooftops need to be tracked and
charges should be levied on them.
As far as revenue expenditure is concerned, we saw that only is the KMC not spending as desired
by the expenditure norms to fund basic services but there is also a consistent fall in revenue
expenditures. We recommend proper audit to monitor the expenditures of the ULB. For Dhaka,
even though the expenditure is significantly below the revenue income, this can hardly be
considered as good fiscal health, given the poor deliverance of services to the city dwellers.
Understandably, the large migrant population, who do live in the city but lack a sense of
ownership given their bearings outside Dhaka, does not generate sufficient demand for quality
services. There are a couple of reasons for that. Firstly, a large majority of the people in Dhaka
city live on rented accommodation, and as such, their willingness to contribute in terms of
charges or taxes would be less as compared to the owners of those dwellings. Secondly, factors
such as low literacy rate and low-income levels (which are a characteristic of the city) are a key
deterrent to the demand for augmented services. Against this backdrop, improvement in the
services and amenities of the city must be supply-driven, based on the premise that enhanced
supply will raise standards and expectations of the people, eventually leading to higher demand.
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Utilizing all the revenue handles to a fuller extent is key to augmenting revenues. The property
tax rates in Dhaka have not been revised for more than three decades. Just this one reform
alongside a good collection efficiency can significantly raise the corporations’ own revenues.
Several unexplored areas can be reined in for raising non-tax revenues. First, cable operator and
mobile tower charges should be tapped. Second, given the congestion in the city some
conservancy charges should be introduced. Third, the car-parking problem should be tackled in
structured manner. The car-parking fee should be introduced such that the fee structure is
contingent on the vehicle type and the space it is occupying. Moreover, differential charges for
peak time and off time, commercial and residential areas should be introduced. In addition to
this, one-time parking fee could be introduced as per the price of the car.
Bangladesh is slated to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Country status in 2024. A key
development challenge would be to make Dhaka, a city that houses more than 35 percent of the
country’s urban population, more sustainable. Towards that end, we recommend that an urban
renewal mission be introduced for the cities of Dhaka. The reform should clearly delineate the
role of upper tiers of the government in supporting the urbanization in the city. In addition, there
should be physical norms designed, which should state the level of service delivery desired
according to the size class of the city corporations. Corresponding to the level of service delivery
there should also be the financial norms instituted. Such an exercise would help assess the
expenditure needs of the cities. Last but not the least, we recommend a proper audit of the
accounts of the local bodies. These measures would help accelerate the pace to making Dhaka a
world-class sustainable city.
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Appendix
Box A1. List of functions devolved under the 74th Amendment Act to Urban Local Bodies
in India
1. Roads and bridges
2. Water supply for domestic industrialization and commercial purpose
3. Burials and burial ground, cremation ground and electric crematorium
4. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stop and public
conveniences
5. Safeguarding interest of weaker section of society, including the handicapped
and mentally retarded
6. Slum improvement and upgradation
7. Urban poverty alleviation
8. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens and
playground
9. Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects
10. Cattle pounds and prevention of cruelty to animals
11. Urban planning, including town planning
12. Regulation of land use and construction of building
13. Planning for economic and social development
14. Fire services
15. Urban forestry, protection of environment and promotion of ecological aspects
16. Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths
17. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries
18. Public health, sanitation conservancy
19. Solid waste management
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Box A2. List of finances devolved to Urban Local Bodies in India

Tax Revenue
1
Property tax
2
Profession tax
3
Sanitation/Conservancy tax (if ‘charge’, then it’s a non tax)
4
Scavenging tax
5
Latrine tax
6
Drainage tax
7
Education tax
8
Entry/Terminal tax
9
Taxes on vehicles
10
Advertisement tax
11
Entertainment tax
12
Pilgrim tax
13
Environment tax/land revenue
14
Betterment/Development tax
15
Passengers & goods tax
16
Timber tax
17
Tax/toll on animals
18
Cable operator tax
19
Toll/Tax on bridges/vehicles
Non-Tax Revenue
20
Sanitation/Conservancy charge
21
Water charges
22
Surcharge on sales tax
23
Birth/Death registration fees
24
Betterment fees
25
Mutation fees
26
Dangerous and offensive trade license fees
27
Slaughter house fees
28
Market fee
29
Fee for fire services
30
Fees on dogs
31
Fees for registration of animals etc.
32
Parking fees
33
Fee on building application
34
Duty on transfer of immovable property
35
Penalty for late tax payment
36
Stamp Duty
37
Rent from municipal properties
38
Receipts from fines
39
Receipts from interest
40
Octroi (After the introduction of GST, this has been abolished)
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Box A3. Valuation Method of Property Tax in Kolkata Municipal Corporation
The property tax is evaluated on the basis of annual rental value. The annual value is
determined by multiplying the monthly rent by 12. Where property is owned by someone, the
monthly rent is determined by comparing the property with similar rented properties in the
locality. A 10 percent statutory allowance is deducted to arrive at annual value. In case of
theatre/cinema halls, 7.5 percent of gross annual receipts less taxes is considered as annual
value of the hall. The tax rates are applicable as following:
S No

Annual Valuation (in rupees)

1
AV less than 600
2
AV greater than 600 but less than 18000
3
AV greater than 18000
Quarterly Tax = Annual Tax/4

Annual Tax
0.11*AV
(AV/600+10)*1/100*AV
0.4*AV

Rebate if tax deposited on
time
0.05* Quarterly Tax
0.05* Quarterly Tax
0.05* Quarterly Tax

Source: KMC Website
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Table A1. Year-Wise Per Capita Revenue Receipts and Per Capita Revenue Expenditure in
KMC, DNCC, DSCC from 2012-13 to 2017-18 (US$)
Category
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure
Property Tax
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Own Revenue
Grants
Total Revenue Receipts
Total Revenue Expenditure

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

Source: Authors’ computation

KMC
31.8
32.5
17.3
49.8
33.6
89.6
87.9

DNCC
4.3
4.5
4.9
9.4
0.4
11.0
3.4

DSCC
4.9
5.0
4.8
9.8
0.7
11.9
5.9

KMC
20.2
20.9
18.0
38.9
31.3
70.3
74.9

DNCC
4.5
4.7
4.4
9.2
0.3
10.6
3.7

DSCC
4.7
4.8
4.6
9.4
2.8
12.6
5.8

KMC
19.8
20.4
13.1
33.6
30.1
63.7
74.5

DNCC
4.4
4.6
4.7
9.3
1.3
10.7
3.6

DSCC
4.1
4.3
5.1
9.4
3.1
12.5
5.9

KMC
20.5
21.6
11.5
33.1
39.8
72.9
76.2

DNCC
4.1
4.2
4.8
9.1
2.2
11.4
3.7

DSCC
4.0
4.1
4.4
8.5
5.9
14.6
6.5

KMC
20.1
20.8
11.1
31.9
33.4
65.3
65.7

DNCC
3.9
4.0
4.1
8.0
0.5
8.7
4.1

DSCC
3.5
3.6
5.7
9.3
0.7
10.1
5.3

KMC
14.5
15.3
8.1
23.5
28.2
51.7
64.0

DNCC
3.3
3.4
3.8
7.2
0.6
8.2
3.7

DSCC
2.8
2.9
3.9
6.8
0.9
7.6
5.8
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Map 1. Dhaka Urban Cluster in Bangladesh

Map 2. Districts in the State of West Bengal in India
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